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Monopoly Pricing on Campus: New York’s
Textbook Access Act
Gary Minda*
One of my fondest memories from my days as a student at
Michigan State University was the “sit in” at the university
bookstore led by my economics professor, the late Walter Ad-
ams.1  Professor Adams was without a doubt one of the most
popular teachers in the university’s economics department, and
he was well known outside the university for speaking out
against the dangers of monopolies in the American economy as
an expert witness in Congress.2  He was gritty and not afraid to
express his views.  As president of the university, he was sup-
portive of the right of students to protest injustices on campus.
Professor Adams taught Economics 444, a senior-level class on
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  This essay was supported by a
summer research stipend from Brooklyn Law School.
1. Walter Adams was the Distinguished University Professor of Economics
and past president of Michigan State University from 1947 until his retirement in
1992.  He then joined Trinity University’s Department of Economics and taught
economics as the Vernon F. Taylor Distinguished Professor of Economics until his
death on September 8, 1998.  He was born in Vienna, Austria in 1922 and moved
with his family to Brooklyn, New York in 1935.  He earned his B.A. in economics
from Brooklyn College in 1942 and then joined the United States Army in 1943,
where he served with distinction in the 83rd Infantry and 11th Armored divi-
sions—landing in Normandy on D-Day, fighting in the Battle of Bulge, and helping
to liberate three concentration camps.  He earned a battlefield commission as a
second lieutenant and was awarded the Bronze Star for heroic conduct.  After
WWII, he completed his graduate studies in economics and earned his M.A. and
Ph.D. degrees at Yale University in 1946 and 1947, respectively.  For many years
at Michigan State, Professor Adams taught a senior-level class (known in the
course catalog as Economics 444) on American enterprise and public policy.  It was
widely reputed to be one of the most difficult but rewarding courses available at
Michigan State.  Robert Bao, Walter Adams, 1922-98, MSU ALUMNI MAGAZINE,
Nov. 25 2006, available at www.msu.edu/unit/msuaa/magazine/w99/adams.htm.
It was Professor Adams and Economics 444 that inspired my desire to be a teacher.
2. One former Economics 444 student wrote that “[s]tudents who signed up
for Econ 444 knew that they were going for the educational adventure of their
lives.”  Jim Brock, An Insider’s View of Economics 444, MSU ALUMNI MAGAZINE,
Nov. 25 2006, available at https://www.msu.edu/unit/msuaa/magazine/w99/adams.
htm.  Professor Adams frequently traveled to Washington, D.C., where he served
as an expert witness at Congressional budget hearings.  Bao, supra note 1.
523
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American enterprise and public policy.  I was fortunate enough
to take this class, and it turned out to be one of the most memo-
rable educational experiences of my life.  It was during class
that Professor Adams encouraged us to protest the monopoly
prices we had to pay for our textbooks by joining him in a sit-in
at the university bookstore.
Textbooks were then, as they are today, a significant bar-
rier to accessing upper level education.3  The average college
student now pays nearly one thousand dollars per year on
course materials and books, a sum that is eclipsed by law stu-
dents who pay, on average, two hundred dollars for a single
casebook for their law classes.4  Textbook publishers can raise
their book prices without fear of losing sales to competition be-
cause they have monopoly power.5  As economists explain, text-
3. Margaret Webb Pressler, Textbook Prices on the Rise, WASH. POST, Sept. 18,
2004, at E01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A30151-2004Sep17.html (“The National Association of College Bookstores says
wholesale prices of college textbooks have risen nearly 40 percent in the past five
years.”).
4. Press Release, N.Y. State Consumer Prot. Bd., New York State Consumer
Protection Board Partners with Barnes and Noble College Booksellers to Raise
Awareness about Lower Textbook Cost Options for Students (Nov. 12, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.consumer.state.ny.us/pressreleases/2008/nov122008.htm (“In
2007-08, students paid an average of $988 for books and supplies, an amount
equivalent to 23% of senior college tuition at SUNY, 25% at CUNY or 28% of aver-
age community college tuition and fees in New York State, according to an April
2008 report entitled Sticker Shock 101, issued by the New York Public Interest
Research Group (NYPIRG).  Over the past two decades, college textbook prices
have increased at twice the rate of inflation, according to a U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO) report issued in 2005.  The report also stated that text-
book prices nearly tripled increasing at an average rate of 6% per year from
December 1986 to December 2004.”). See also COLL. BD., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRIC-
ING 9 (2007), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/about/
news_info/trends/trends_pricing_07.pdf (charting “variation in tuition fee in-
creases” between public and private institutions from 2007-2008).
5. Pressler, supra note 3 (“The $3.4 billion-a-year higher-education publishing
industry says . . . that [textbook] prices are competitive in each market.”). See also
National Association of College Stores, Where the New Textbook Dollar Goes,
http://www.nacs.org/common/research/textbook$.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2009)
(reporting the average college textbook cost allocation as 23.7% college bookstore
cost, 11.7% author royalty, and 64.6% publisher’s revenue and cost).  The industry
is a classic oligopoly with five firms—Pearson, Cengage Learning, Thompson,
Houghton Mifflin, and McGraw-Hill—controlling 80% of the supply. See JAMES V.
KOCH, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TEXTBOOK PRICING AND TEXTBOOK MARKETS 6
(2006), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/acsfa/kochreport.pdf.
Furthermore, high startup costs keep new companies from entering the market
and challenging the oligopoly. Id.
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/9
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book publishers are in the same position as drug makers; they
offer unique products protected by intellectual property rights
(patent, copyright, and trademark protection) and benefit from
the moral hazard of having doctors or professors require the
drug or the book without regard to the cost ultimately paid by
the consumer.6  The person who buys the product does not get to
choose it, and hence the price of the product is something that
becomes merely what one needs to pay if he or she wants either
medical treatment or an education.
In protest of what he understood as monopoly pricing, Pro-
fessor Adams encouraged his economics class to join him in a
day of protest by sitting-in at the university bookstore.  Profes-
sor Adams put his economic ideas into action and encouraged
his class to do the same.  His personal initiative was reflected in
his writing and teaching that advocated taking “positive action”
to halt monopoly pricing in our society.7  Taking his class to the
bookstore that day to protest intolerable textbook prices was
perhaps motivated by these ideals and presented a real lesson
6. Noam Cohen, Don’t Buy That Textbook, Download it Free, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
14, 2008, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/technology/15
link.html.  Professor Koch explains that the college textbook market does not oper-
ate according to the same economic principles as a normal consumer market.
KOCH, supra note 5, at 2.  First, the end consumers (students) do not select the
product, and the people choosing the product (faculty) do not purchase the product.
Id.  Therefore, price is removed from the purchasing decision, giving the producers
(publishers) disproportionate market power to set prices high. See id.  This funda-
mental flaw in the market is blamed as the primary reason that prices are out of
control. See id.  Congressman David Wu, in addressing the Advisory Committee
on Financial Assistance, used the term “broken market” to explain this phenome-
non. ADVISORY COMM. ON STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SUM-
MARY OF THE ADVISORY COMM.’S HEARING ON NEXT STEPS IN IMPROVING COLLEGE
ACCESS AND PERSISTENCE 6 (2006), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
1232010/-description-tags-sept06hringsum.  The more common name for this phe-
nomenon is “moral hazard.” See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS 53-55 (3d ed. 2003).  The concept of moral hazard is based on the
way insurance can change the way people respond to risk, including taking more
risks. Id. at 53.  Hence an insurance policy that completely eliminates a risk might
have the undesirable side effect of causing people to be less careful and thus expose
themselves to more risk. Id. at 54.
7. WALTER ADAMS, Public Policy in a Free Enterprise Economy, in THE STRUC-
TURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 482, 513 (5th ed. 1977) (“A hard look at the choice
before us is indicated because, in the absence of positive action, we can expect little
but aimless drifting and a gradual erosion of our traditional values [caused by mo-
nopoly pricing].”).  I continue to encourage my antitrust law students to read this
essay as an introduction to the reality of monopoly pricing in the American
economy.
3
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in the importance of understanding both theory and practice.
The sit-in at the bookstore taught me that the dangers of mo-
nopoly pricing were more than just an abstraction of economics
and that the solution to such dangers may require direct action
by consumers.8
This year, the New York State legislature passed the Text-
book Access Act (“Act”),9 which purports to finally do something
about monopoly prices in the textbook industry.10  In the pream-
ble, the Act declares that “[i]t is the policy of the state that any
institution of higher education receiving money from the state
shall work to identify ways to reduce student expenditures on
course materials, thereby making college more affordable.”11
The Act requires textbook publishers to disclose wholesale
prices to faculty in state supported universities.12  The Act also
allows a faculty member to order a textbook without the supple-
mentary materials normally “bundled” with the hard copy
text.13
In this short essay, I will explain what this Act purports to
do and how it fails to end monopoly pricing of textbooks.  I will
also offer some ideas that college administrators and teachers
might consider in order to become more proactive in addressing
the problem of textbook pricing.  Drawing from the story of the
sit-in at the Michigan State University bookstore and the rec-
ommendations of the New York Public Interest Research
Group’s (“NYPIRG”) recent report on textbook prices,14 I will
suggest some direct action strategies for countering the monop-
oly chokehold that textbook publishers now maintain.  I will
also suggest what a more effective Textbook Access Act should
require.  The Act is unlikely to solve the monopoly pricing on
8. See id.
9. Ch. 433, 2008 N.Y. Laws 433 (codified as amended at N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§§ 720-724 (McKinney Supp. 2009) (effective July 1, 2009)).
10. See id.
11. Id. § 1.
12. N.Y. EDUC. LAW. § 721(1).
13. Id. § 722. See also id. § 720(1) (“ ‘Bundled’ means a textbook and any other
learning material, including, but not limited to, workbooks, online technologies,
dictionaries, CD-ROMS, or books, packaged together to be sold for one price.”).
14. See N.Y. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, STICKER-SHOCK 101: FACULTY
OPINIONS ABOUT TEXTBOOK PRICES, PUBLISHERS’ TACTICS, AND EFFORTS TO REIN IN
TEXTBOOK PRICES (2008), available at http://www.nypirg.org/higher_ed/Sticker
Shock101.pdf.
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/9
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New York campuses, but it does offer the first step toward the
development of affordable textbook prices.
I. New York’s Textbook Access Act
New York Governor David A. Paterson signed the Textbook
Access Act into law on the last day of the legislative session in
2008, and it will take effect on July 1, 2009.15  The Act is very
similar to Section 112 of the federal Higher Education Opportu-
nity Act,16 which was signed into law on August 14, 2008.17  The
stated intent of the Act is “to help ensure students are receiving
fair value for the course materials they purchase.  Therefore,
the purpose of this act is to promote open and transparent mar-
keting choice, pricing and purchasing of course materials.”18
Specifically, the Act requires publishers to sell textbooks
and related materials “in the same manner as ordered by such
faculty,”19 thus allowing faculty to order “unbundled” texts to
ensure “pricing transparency.”20  The Act further encourages
faculty members to make their textbook selections early so both
the school’s bookstore and students have more time to find less
15. See ch. 433, 2008 N.Y. Laws 433.
16. Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 112, 122 Stat. 3078, 3107-10 (2008) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1015b).  “The purpose of this section is to ensure that stu-
dents have access to affordable course materials by decreasing costs to students
and enhancing transparency and disclosure with respect to the selection,
purchase, sale, and use of course materials.” Id.
17. See id. § 1125, 122 Stat. at 3508.
18. Ch. 433, § 1, 2008 N.Y. Laws 433.
19. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 722 (McKinney Supp. 2009) (effective July 1, 2009)
(“Textbooks shall be sold in the same manner as ordered by such faculty member
or entity in charge of selecting textbooks for courses.  In the event such product is
unavailable as ordered, the bookstore, faculty, and relevant publisher shall work
together to provide the best possible substitute that most closely matches the re-
quested item or items, and the publisher shall make available the price of such
substitute or substitutes readily available.”).
20. Id. § 721 (“To ensure pricing transparency, all publishers of college text-
books shall, on request, make readily available to prospective adopters of their
products who are members of the faculties or purchasing entities of institutions of
higher education the price at which the publisher would make the products availa-
ble to the college bookstore that would offer the products to students.”).  The Act
thus intends to end the practice of “textbook bundling” (selling printed materials
together with electronic or other media without choice) by mandating that publish-
ers’ pricing structures of course material be transparent for each product. See id.
§§ 720, 721.
5
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expensive used books in the aftermarket.21  It also prohibits any
“employee at an institution of higher education [from] de-
mand[ing] or receiv[ing] any payment, loan, advance, goods, or
deposit of money, present or promised, for adopting specific
course materials required for coursework or instruction . . . .”22
The Act does exempt, however, publisher distribution of “sam-
ple copies, instructor’s copies, or instructional materials, that
are not to be sold.”23  In addition, the Act exempts “royalties or
other compensation from sales of textbooks that include such
instructor’s own writing or work; . . . honoraria for academic
peer review of course materials; or . . . training in the use of
course materials and learning technologies.”24
The Act states that it is the “policy of the state that any
institution of higher education . . . shall work to identify ways to
reduce student expenditures on course materials, thereby mak-
ing college more affordable.”25  However, the Act only applies to
“any institution of higher education receiving money from the
state . . . .”26  It defines such institutions as those “recognized
and approved by the regents of the university of the state of
New York, which provides a course of study leading to the
granting of a post-secondary degree or diploma.”27  Thus, the
Act does not cover private, non-state supported colleges and
universities.
Of course, it is the faculty who order the texts to be used in
their courses, and there is nothing in the Act that encourages
faculty to choose lower-cost options in making their book adop-
tions.  The Act’s requirement of transparency and “unbundling”
will, however, help those faculty members who want to make
price sensitive choices.28  Bundled materials such as CD-ROMS,
workbooks, and the like can significantly add to the price of the
21. Id. § 723 (“Each institution of higher education shall institute policies that
encourage faculty members or the entity in charge of textbook adoptions to place
their orders with sufficient lead-time to enable the university, or contract-man-
aged, bookstore to confirm the availability of the requested materials and, when
appropriate, the availability of used textbooks or alternative digital formats.”).
22. Id. § 724.
23. Id. § 724(1).
24. Id. § 724(2)-(4).
25. Ch. 433, § 1, 2008 N.Y. Laws 433.
26. Id.
27. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 720(2).
28. See id. §§ 721(1), 722.
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/9
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basic text, and some faculty may not know that the book they
choose is bundled because a single price is charged for all
materials.29  On the other hand, if a faculty member has picked
a text that is bundled, the Act does not require the publisher to
sell the book as an unbundled stand-alone text.30
Nor is there anything in the Act that would encourage ad-
ministrators to use their purchasing power to negotiate lower
priced materials for students.  What is even more problematic is
that the Act fails to encourage faculty or administrators to sup-
port the development of aftermarkets where used texts are sold
at substantially lower prices than those suggested by the pub-
lisher for a new copy.  For example, the Act does not make it
lawful for faculty members to resell complimentary copies of
textbooks, which they receive from publishing companies.  The
Act states that “sample copies, [and] instructor’s copies . . . are
not to be sold . . . .”31  These books are given to faculty when
they are considering adopting textbooks for their courses and
are a potential source for the used book aftermarket.  The Act
should encourage faculty members to give these textbooks to
their respective university’s bookstore to support the
aftermarket that competes with new textbooks.  If publishers
object to such action, then the Act should require the publishers
to provide low cost alternatives for the textbooks they sell in
university book stores.
While the Act establishes a useful policy for reducing mo-
nopoly pricing of textbooks, it fails in a number of important
respects.  Primarily, the Act fails to do anything meaningful
about the moral hazards created by a system that gives no in-
centive to faculty to order lower-cost texts and materials for
their students.  The problem is that the student who buys the
book has no voice in the selection process.  This places the stu-
dent in the same position as the person who buys drugs pre-
scribed by a doctor.  Prescription drug prices are intolerably
high partly due to moral hazards created by a system that al-
lows doctors to prescribe drugs regardless of cost.32  Today, how-
ever, the Food and Drug Administration requires
29. See id. § 720(1).
30. See id. § 722.
31. Id. § 724.
32. See Cohen, supra note 6.
7
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pharmaceutical companies to provide information about lower-
cost generic drugs.33  The Textbook Access Act requires price
transparency on wholesale prices,34 but this information is to be
given to faculty who request it and who may or may not take it
into account in selecting their course materials.35
This does not remove the problem of moral hazard.  A
faculty member who authors a textbook will naturally want to
use that book, and therefore the choice of texts will not be based
on cost considerations.  Other faculty may simply want to use
the best book, regardless of cost.  Still others may simply not
pay attention to the cost issue.  The parent or student who actu-
ally pays for the text will not be able to have a choice in the
selection decision.  The cost of the materials no longer becomes
a factor in the forces that created demand because consumers
do not have substitutes to turn to when faced with high prices.
Textbook prices thus behave like drug prices, forever maintain-
ing levels that could only be maintained by a monopoly.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Act that changes the
textbook publishers’ and universities’ or colleges’ marketing
practices that are responsible for the monopoly pricing.  What is
missing in the Act is a change in the underlying marketing sys-
tem that publishers and institutions of higher education have
created for selling and distributing course materials to students
at inflated monopoly prices.  University book stores and admin-
istrators actually serve to facilitate monopoly pricing by text-
book publishers by failing to encourage vibrant aftermarkets in
used textbooks and use the bulk purchasing power of the school
to negotiate lower prices from the publisher.
II. Recommendations for More Effective Textbook
Legislation: Changing the Monopoly Market Structure
In order to have a meaningful impact on monopoly pricing,
the structure of the market must change.  A monopolist will sell
at the highest price that clears the market, and if there is no
competition, that price will always be set at a higher level.36
33. See 21 C.F.R. § 200.200(a)(2) (2009).
34. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 721(1).
35. Id.
36. See ADAMS, supra note 7, at 485.
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/9
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Normally, prices will remain at competitive lower levels so long
as consumers can choose alternative substitute products.37  The
key to maintaining low competitive prices is the availability of
substitute products in the market.38  If prices for a product re-
main at relatively high levels for a period of time, then it must
be that consumers lack alternatives.39  High prices can be main-
tained if there are no substitute products because the firm can
then restrict its output, thereby enhancing the price level of its
products.40  The basic rule is that if you change market struc-
ture, you can change conduct and performance.41
In the case of textbook prices, this means that the focus
should be on understanding the market dynamics of the mar-
keting and distribution system that textbook publishers and
universities create within their bookstores.  By changing the
structure of how books are bought and sold, one can change the
ultimate price performance of textbooks.  This is the basic or-
ganizing rule that the New York legislature should have fol-
lowed in the Act.
A. Intellectual Property Is Not the Problem, But It Can Be
One of the Solutions
One might think that high textbook prices result from the
royalties paid to the author of the text, since it is the author
who has a proprietary interest by virtue of copyright law.42
Textbook publishers, however, pay insubstantial royalties to
the author—less than twelve percent of the purchase price.43  It
is true that an author of a popular text that enjoys wide adop-
tion can earn substantial royalty fees by virtue of the large
quantity of sales.  But even those authors who do receive hand-
37. Id. at 486.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 507-08.
42. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-51
(1991) (finding that copyright assures authors the right to their original expression
but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a
work).
43. See National Association of College Stores, supra note 5.
9
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some rewards are still earning substantially less than the
publisher.44
The problem is that authors lack the bargaining power nec-
essary to negotiate publishing contracts that would better favor
their interests.  Today, book publishing contracts are written by
the publisher and are offered on a “take it or leave it” basis.45
Most authors do not receive any royalty payments or advances
until the cost of publishing the hardcover edition is fully recov-
ered by the publisher.46  Royalty rates are then paid only after a
certain number of copies of the text are sold and are merely five
or ten percent of the retail price of the text.47  For the vast ma-
jority of authors, royalty payments amount to just a few hun-
dred dollars and some authors receive no monetary return on
the publication.  There are exceptions:  some authors who sell
popular books are rewarded substantially, but textbooks of
these well known authors usually have a robust aftermarket
that works to provide students with low cost used texts.
The copyright of the text does, however, remain a potential
source of power that the authors could use to alter textbook
pricing.  First, if academic authors could organize into an asso-
ciation of authors, such an association could then bargain on
behalf of the group for better contract terms and provisions for
price ceilings on the text.  The Act is already moving in this di-
rection by allowing individual authors to require unbundling
and greater transparency in wholesale pricing, with the ulti-
mate goal of pressuring the textbook publishers to reduce their
prices.48  The problem with New York’s minimalist approach is
that it relies on individual faculty to take action.49  Individuals,
however, simply lack the bargaining power, time, or skills nec-
essary to negotiate better price terms from the publishers.
Academics should follow the example of workers who have
organized themselves into unions and engage in collective bar-
gaining with their employers.  If academic authors were to or-
44. See id.
45. See e.g., Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671, 679-82 (2d Cir. 1983).
46. The actual royalty will depend on the ability of the author to negotiate the
fee, but in the context of law school publication, these are standard fees that can be
expected.
47. See National Association of College Stores, supra note 5.
48. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 722 (McKinney Supp. 2009) (effective July 1, 2009).
49. See id.
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/9
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ganize themselves, they would be able to countervail the
bargaining power of textbook publishers.  Collective negotia-
tions by the copyright holders could be used to reduce book
prices, since reduced prices would lead to greater sales and ulti-
mately lower prices for students.  The effort would benefit both
authors and students because collective action would go a long
way in countervailing the monopoly power of the publishers.
For example, the Act could have allowed faculty members to
pool their royalty rights with one member from the pool to be
the exclusive bargaining agent for the group.  This selected in-
dividual would be charged with negotiating the lowest retail
price for the textbooks.  This arrangement would also include a
provision that grants the members the right to receive the stan-
dard royalty payment.  The statutory royalty would ensure that
faculty members receive what they would expect without pool-
ing, thus encouraging the faculty to collectivize for the purpose
of reducing monopoly prices without having to take a cut in roy-
alty income.
B. University Support for the Aftermarket
One way to counter the monopoly levels of textbook pricing
would be to encourage the development of the aftermarket for
new and used textbooks.  Faculty should be encouraged to ei-
ther sell or donate complementary copies that they receive from
the publishers to textbook expediters and clearing houses that
specialize in selling new and used textbooks at reduced prices.50
Faculty members are given free complementary copies to ex-
amine each year.  These complementary copies are given for ex-
amination purposes only and are not intended for resale.
However, once the complementary copy is given to the faculty
member, it is the faculty member’s property.  Faculty should do-
nate these copies to their schools for resale to students at sub-
stantially reduced prices.  Resale of complementary copies
would not be illegal, and any attempt to prevent resale would
and should be regarded as an unlawful interference with the
rights of property.
50. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Textbooks, http://www.amazon.com/New-Used-
Textbooks-Books/b?ie=UTF8&node=465600 (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) (subdivi-
sion of Amazon.com selling new and used textbooks); eCampus, http://www.
ecampus.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) (online vendor of aftermarket textbooks).
11
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Universities can also encourage the formation of
aftermarkets for used textbooks by instituting new policies for
establishing aftermarket programs in their bookstores.  There
is already a well established practice of selling used textbooks
in most university bookstores.  The existence of used textbooks
for sale is an important aftermarket that can compete with the
sales of new textbooks and can create downward pressure on
the publishers’ textbook prices.  These aftermarkets need to be
expanded and more fully developed by educational institutions
themselves.
Institutions can also create programs where new texts from
publishers are rented to students with the goal of selling the
used copy after its return for a recovery charge of the original
price of the new text.  Administrators could adopt a policy that
encourages faculty members to donate free copies to bookstores
for resale to students.  The institutions would have to subsidize
bookstores to administer rental programs, but the subsidy could
be made part of a loan that the bookstores would have to repay
at favorable interest rates.  The ultimate statutory policy would
be to create a structure for stimulating competition in the col-
lege textbook market on campus.
C. Minimizing the Moral Hazard Problem
Faculty should also be encouraged to consider cost in mak-
ing their textbook selections.  Deans and administrators should
ask each faculty member to choose low cost options of texts
whenever possible, and faculty should be subject to disclosure
requirements, explaining why a higher cost, newer edition text-
book is necessary.  Academic freedom ultimately protects
faculty choice of materials, but the academic freedom to choose
should not allow faculty to act like drug makers and simply dis-
regard the moral hazards of the choices they make in selecting
books that their students must buy in the market.  The problem
of moral hazard is now partly responsible for the high textbook
prices.51  Faculty who get to choose their course materials need
to exercise responsibility to lower the prices of the materials
they require their students to buy.  Reasonable intervention in
51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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the normal prerogatives of professors and instructors may be
necessary.
The Act does not directly allow students a choice, but it
does allow faculty to choose unbundled materials, and it gives
faculty access to price information.52   Thus, the Act does not
solve the moral hazard problem.  In order to do what has been
done in prescription drug markets, New York’s legislature
should subsidize institutions of higher education that establish
alternative formats for distributing course materials.53  There
are a number of important projects that can be utilized to
restructure the textbook market, and they should be en-
couraged by state subsidies and low-cost loans.
First, faculty can be encouraged to move to online publica-
tion of course materials.  Professor R. Preston McAfee, an eco-
nomics professor at the California Institute of Technology, has
led the way with this idea by providing free online access to his
introductory economics textbook.54  Professor McAfee is re-
ported to have foregone royalties (estimated at one hundred
thousand dollars over the life of the text) in order to save his
students the text’s purchase list price of approximately two
hundred dollars.55  The model is based on what is known in the
open-source movement as a Wikibook.56  Professor McAfee does
license his economics textbook to smaller publishers—Lulu and
Flat World Knowledge—to sell the print version of the book at
52. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 722.
53. The policy for doing this is the same policy that has justified state legisla-
tion providing subsidies for prescription drugs.  For a review of subsidy legislation
in prescription drug markets, see Robert Pear, States Creating Plans to Reduce
Drug Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/04/23/us/states-creating-plans-to-reduce-costs-for-drugs.html?fta=Y.
54. See R. PRESTON MCAFEE, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2006),
available at http://www.introecon.com/IEA.pdf.
55. Cohen, supra note 6.
56. Wikibooks, http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Apr. 20,
2009).  Wikibooks are collaborative internet textbooks that anyone can edit. Id.
They are based on the popular Wikipedia model, which invites internet users to
make and correct entries in the internet encyclopedia known as Wikipedia.  A
wikibook is a textbook, annotated text, instructional guide, and/or manual. Id.
Wiki materials can be used in a traditional classroom, an accredited or respected
institution, or a home-school environment, as part of a Wikiversity course or for
self-learning. Id.  As a general rule, only instructional books are allowed in the
Wiki community.  The use of literary elements, such as allegory or fables, as in-
structional tools can be permitted in some situations. Id.
13
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list prices that “further constrain [textbook publishers’] ability
to engage in monopoly pricing,”57 and his open-source text has
been adopted at Claremont-McKenna College and Harvard
University.58
By providing state subsidies and low cost loans, New York
could encourage its state universities to experiment with pro-
grams for the development of free online course materials for
students.  Faculty who agree to participate in creating free on-
line course materials could be compensated by stipends from
the state equal to, or maybe even greater than, the typical roy-
alty revenues they would receive from textbook publishers.  The
economic case for state subsidies can be justified by reducing
the cost of tuition assistance programs that would no longer
have to cover the full cost of print materials from commercial
publishers.
One model to consider is the free textbook web entity
known as Connexions, which offers free textbooks online and is
supported by a William and Flora Hewlett Foundation grant.59
Connexions is an internet repository for textbooks based on a
“Creative Commons” license, which allows users to “rip, burn
and mash” material into new configurations that suit the pur-
poses of the user, who can then download the new configura-
tion.60  The advantage of such a network is that it allows
teachers to easily update materials they use for their courses
without placing financial burdens on their students who must
buy the material.61  Connexions works best for statistics, phys-
ics, and electrical engineering courses where updating is con-
stant and necessary.62  A comparable model is the open course
networking site at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
57. Cohen, supra note 6.
58. Id.
59. See id. See also Connexions, FAQ, http://cnx.org/aboutus/faq (last visited
Apr. 20, 2009). Connexions is an internet community that shares educational ma-
terial made of small knowledge chunks called “modules” that can be organized as
courses, books, reports, etc., for those who are interested in finding and exploring
new knowledge content in various fields of study. Id. Anyone may view or contrib-
ute to the material. Id. Connexions is a place to create and collaborate in the
building and sharing of custom collections of intellectual content. Id.
60. Cohen, supra note 6.
61. See id.
62. See id.
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/9
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called OpenCourseWare (“OCW”).63  OCW, however, is a limited
content sharing site and does not provide the same freedoms as
Connexions.64
There is also the open source project known as Course-
Smart, which is owned by a number of publishers that are cur-
rently developing online textbooks for a fee.65  The service
allows students to subscribe to a textbook, read it online, and
download portions of the text for highlighting and printing.66
The fee for the online service is approximately one half the cost
of the print version of the book, which is still substantial given
that the average print textbook today sells for about two hun-
dred dollars.67  There are now approximately four thousand
texts available on CourseSmart.68  The danger with this model
is that it may facilitate cartel behavior and price fixing by the
publishers who have created the CourseSmart website.69  Such
a website may allow the publishers to exchange information
63. See MITOpenCourseWare, About OCW, http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/web/
about/about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). OCW “is a free publication of
MIT course materials that reflects almost all the undergraduate and graduate sub-
jects taught at MIT.” Id. OCW is open and available to the world, with no regis-
tration or enrollment process, and is a permanent MIT activity. Id. OCW does not
grant degrees or certificates or provide access to MIT faculty. Id. Additionally,
materials presented on the website may not reflect the entire content of the course,
but the site does include video lectures, notes, examinations and text. See id.
64. See Cohen, supra note 6.
65. See CourseSmart, http://www.coursesmart.com (last visited Apr. 20,
2009). CourseSmart is a joint venture founded by five higher education textbook
publishers. Id.  The founding publishers are Bedford, Freeman & Worth Publish-
ing Group; Cengage Learning (formerly Thomson Learning); Houghton Mifflin;
McGraw-Hill Education; Pearson Education; and John Wiley & Sons. Id.  Cengage
subsequently acquired Houghton Mifflin, reducing the number to five. See id.
CourseSmart brings together thousands of textbooks across hundreds of courses in
an e-book format on a common platform. Id. CourseSmart allows students to find
their assigned textbook as an e-Textbook at savings that average 51% versus the
print version. Id.  The value of CourseSmart is web functionality allowing for ease
of search functions, instant access, and note taking—all with computer access,
which provides new opportunities for “wired” campuses. Id.
66. Cohen, supra note 6.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Exchanges of information between dominant firms in an oligopolistic in-
dustry can facilitate illegal price fixing, especially when there are entry barriers as
there are in the publication industry and when price competition is not a con-
straining force on competitors as is the case in the textbook market. See LAW-
RENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 5.6c (rev. ed.
2000) (discussing United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969)).
15
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and coordinate, thereby stabilizing prices and publication out-
put.  It would thus be preferable if authors and faculty con-
trolled the web site and content for e-textbook publishing.
Universities ought to be investing in online and open source
projects.  While not all subjects will lend themselves to these
models, the more projects that are instituted, the more likely
that the current moral hazard problem will be broken.  By
changing the authorship model, open source and online publish-
ing can remedy the failed market system where prices fail to
allocate texts efficiently at the lowest possible prices.  The per-
son who buys the text must be brought back into the pricing
system, and online publishing and open source projects are at
least nudging the pricing structure of textbooks in that
direction.
D. Generic Textbook Alternatives
One way to minimize the moral hazard problem involving
textbook pricing would be to do what federal and state govern-
ments have done in dealing with similar moral hazard problems
involving drug sales.  Drug companies are required to provide
information about generic drugs that would be good substitutes
for the proprietary drugs they sell.70  This disclosure allows con-
sumers to recognize and choose lower-cost generic drugs.71  In
addition, moral hazard problems are avoided by allowing phar-
macies to fill prescriptions with the low-cost generic whenever a
doctor has prescribed a higher cost proprietary drug.72
University faculty could also agree to adopt a “generic”
textbook created for the basic courses they teach.  The generic
text could be the product of material derived from zero-cost in-
ternet sources like Connexions or an intra-campus e-textbook
community.  This approach is indicative of the open course
movement created by OCW, which now consists of more than
two hundred academic institutions worldwide.73  Yale Univer-
sity, Johns Hopkins, Tufts, and Notre Dame have all joined the
70. See 21 C.F.R. § 200.200(a)(2) (2009).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See OpenCourseWare Consortium: About Us, http://www.ocwconsortium.
org/about-us/about-us.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/9
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-3\PLR307.txt unknown Seq: 17 30-JUN-09 14:28
2009] MONOPOLY PRICING ON CAMPUS 539
consortium of schools promoting OCW.74  Virtually all M.I.T.
courses are now available online for free on the OCW site,
which currently receives more than one million hits per
month.75  Yale University has adopted an OCW model that of-
fers “courses [that] span the full range of liberal arts disciplines,
including humanities, social sciences, and physical and biologi-
cal sciences.”76  On the other hand, the commercial version of
OCW that sells e-textbooks has not proven to reduce textbook
prices significantly.77
If faculty could agree to adopt a generic text for the basic
course they teach and then make it available online, perhaps for
a minimal fee, with the ability to supplement the online mate-
rial for particular classroom uses, then there would be an effec-
tive, low-cost alternative to the print texts now being sold in the
university bookstore.  Generic alternatives would, in theory,
compete with the higher cost authorship model sold by textbook
publishers.  While open-source textbooks will not be an answer
for all subject matters, they should be supported, developed,
and adopted by faculty and administrators as a means for pro-
viding students with generic substitutes that cost less and are
likely to be more up-to-date, since online supplementation and
revision would be more efficient and expeditious than tradi-
tional print publication.
74. See id. See also About Open Yale Courses, http://oyc.yale.edu/about (last
visited Apr. 20, 2009).
75. Online University Courses Hit Big, CBCNEWS.CA, Dec. 31, 2007, http://
www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2007/12/31/mit.html. See also MITOpenCourseWare,
supra note 63.
76. About Yale Open Courses, supra note 74.
77. See Merris Stansbury, Online Textbooks, Hope or Hype?, ESCHOOL NEWS,
Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.eschoolnews.com/news/top-news/index.cfm?i=55156&i-d.
One study by the Student Public Interest Research Groups found the offerings
from CourseSmart were too expensive and hard to access. Id.  The Study also
found that
CourseSmart digital texts on average cost the same as a new hard copy of
the same title bought and sold back to the bookstore—and they cost 39 per-
cent more than a used hard copy of the same title bought and sold back
online. . . . CourseSmart’s printing options were limited to 10 pages per ses-
sion for each of the eTextbooks available—and buying and printing just half
an electronic text reportedly cost three times as much as buying a used hard
copy and selling it back to the bookstore. . . . CourseSmart’s eTextbooks ex-
pired after 180 days, so students did not have the ability to access their
books in the future.
Id.  Most e-textbooks have an average price of fifty dollars. Id.
17
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E. Hardware and Technology: E-books and Cloud Computing
One model for developing the hardware and technology for
the next generation of university textbooks is already provided
by Amazon’s Kindle book or Microsoft’s E-book Reader.78  These
new electronic readers use electronic paper that is readable in
direct sunlight, weigh less than a pound, and are the size of a
small notebook.79  They are based on a new cloud computing
technology which allows readers, at a low cost, to download
books that are stored on a mainframe computer through the
same technology currently used for cellphones and WiFi com-
puters.80  Because of this new, inexpensive technology, there is
no longer any reason why university students, including gradu-
ate and law students, should be required to carry bulky and
heavy texts to class.  Instead, a simple electronic reader could
be used that would access all the texts and related materials
that are needed for every course at a fraction of the cost of actu-
ally purchasing such materials.
These new electronic books also enable the reader to search
the internet for recent developments, as well as access diction-
ary definitions and other textual material related to assigned
class readings.  There is no reason why publishers could not al-
low authors to make their texts electronically available through
this new technology.  The fact that the cost of the electronic
texts would be less than what a hardcover would sell for may
well be offset by increased sales.  Moreover, students and read-
ers who still wish to have a hard cover version would be able to
purchase the actual text at the higher price.
One could imagine students accessing a library of texts in
the cloud of a university’s computer system.  The cloud would be
created by the professorate, who would make their texts accessi-
ble via the school’s internet network.  Students who pay a fee to
download individual texts would gain access to the cloud.  The
texts would then be available as e-texts, which students could
underline, edit, and pull apart in bites for their notes and out-
lines.  The text would be easily updated and revised by the au-
thor.  Of course, this, as well as the other alternatives
78. Steven Levy, The Future of Reading, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 2007, at 54,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/70983.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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discussed, would require the cooperation of authors and pub-
lishers.  But without any incentive or pressure to change, the
status quo will probably remain.
F. Student Direct Action Pressure
As my experience in Professor Adams’s class once taught
me, students are not helpless victims of monopoly textbook pric-
ing—they can counter it by taking direct political action.  First,
students can demand that their schools provide them with the
published textbook International Standard Book Numbers
(“ISBN”) online, so they can search the internet to determine if
lower-cost alternatives are available in the primary and secon-
dary-aftermarkets.  If universities provided students with the
ISBN for all required texts in their course schedules, students
would be in a much better position to find lower cost books.
Second, because universities allow bookstores to sell books
on-campus, students can demand that administrators pressure
textbook publishers and bookstore managers to reduce the costs
of the books they sell.  Third, students should demand that ad-
ministrators use their purchasing power to negotiate lower
prices from textbook publishers.  A large state university sys-
tem, like SUNY or CUNY, is responsible for selling a lot of text-
books and print materials.  These institutions should seek to
negotiate quantity discounts through bulk purchasing, much in
the same way that Walmart does in negotiating low wholesale
prices for the products it sells.81  The purchasing power of a
large state institution like SUNY can act as a countervailing
power to the monopoly position of textbook publishers.  If the
administrators do not take such action, then students should
pressure their administrators to respond to their interest in
seeking lower cost course materials.  As consumers, students
(and in some cases, their parents) are an important constitu-
ency that administrators cannot ignore.
Finally, students could experiment with other direct action
strategies, including sit-ins at school bookstores, to protest the
monopoly pricing of textbooks.  From my own experience, I can
81. See ARINDRAJIT DUBE ET AL., UC BERKLEY CTR. FOR LABOR RESEARCH AND
EDUC., LIVING WAGE POLICIES AND WAL-MART: HOW A HIGHER WAGE STANDARD
WOULD IMPACT WAL-MART WORKERS AND SHOPPERS 2 (2007), available at http://
laborcenter.berkeley.edu/retail/walmart_livingwage_policies07.pdf.
19
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-3\PLR307.txt unknown Seq: 20 30-JUN-09 14:28
542 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:523
say that demonstrations at bookstores can be an empowering
strategy for raising the community’s consciousness of the mo-
nopoly pricing problem.  I recall how the sit-in at the Michigan
State University bookstore, instigated by an economics profes-
sor dressed in a tweed sport coat and tie, brought attention to
the high cost of textbooks being sold.  I am not saying that the
world changed as a result of the sit-in, but it did get the atten-
tion of administrators, faculty, and other students.
Like most sixties demonstrations, once the sit-in ended and
everyone left, the world went back to business as usual.  The
book store continued to sell books at monopoly level prices be-
cause the underlying market forces were simply conducive to
allowing textbook publishers to sell their products at intolera-
bly high prices.  On the other hand, as my experience has
taught me, participation in direct action can be a great moment
of learning in one’s life.  It can also teach others of the need for
change.  Who can say for sure that the lessons of direct action
by students and teachers would not influence university admin-
istrators and state legislators to take more aggressive action to
counter monopoly book pricing?  Perhaps activism on the cam-
pus can be one of the most effective strategies for mobilizing
support for more meaningful change and end the greed and ex-
ploitation of textbook publishers who use our great universities
and colleges to make money at the expense of students and
their families.
IV. Conclusion: What Textbook Access Legislation
Should Require
While New York’s Textbook Access Act is a beneficial first
step in bringing down textbook prices, more effective action is
needed.  Textbook prices will remain at monopoly levels so long
as textbook publishers can benefit from the moral hazards of
allowing someone who does not have to pay for the book to
choose which book students must buy in the marketplace.  The
legislative goal should be to restructure the market for text-
books as it now exists on college campuses.  The fact that the
site of the market is on campus means that universities have a
responsibility to do something to reduce the cost of education for
its students.  Universities cannot sit on the sidelines and allow
private textbook companies to come on campus and sell their
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/9
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texts at monopoly level prices.  Rather, universities should be
actively supporting aftermarkets and faculty and student ef-
forts to create generic substitute course materials that students
can buy at affordable prices.
Moreover, it is in the self-interest of students and faculty to
encourage administrators to facilitate changes in the current
textbook pricing market.  Authors of the print materials will ul-
timately discover that reducing the monopoly power of textbook
publishers may lead to greater freedom and reward in the de-
velopment of a new generation of course materials for the uni-
versities of the twenty-first century.  The current authorship
model that is now utilized by textbook publishers to sell their
products at monopoly prices must be changed if higher educa-
tion is to be available to all that are qualified.
21
